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Most significant to introduce the main theme characteristic for Kierkegaard’s 
concept of the poet in its duplicity: the poet as artist and the poet as existent 
individual, are the following critical remarks from his Journal.
He wrote these remarks in late 1854 against Adam Oehlenschlager, the 
celebrated poet of the Danish golden age, who in his tragedy of 1836 Sokrates 
on the immortality of the soul, had dared to use his Ucentia poetica beyond 
its limits.
Kierkegaard’s destructive and constructive criticism is as follows:
“ What is Deceptive about Socrates.
What is deceptive about Socrates is that his irony is so witty and his intellect 
so superior that a person is tempted to forget completely that what he is dealing 
with is simultaneously a matter of life and death.
We read Plato’s Apology and are enthralled: how extremely witty he is,
how pointed every word, how perfect------alas, we who are spoiled by the
cursed notion that to be an author is the greatest of all are tempted to read 
him as if he were an author, a witty author who probably would even get an 
A-plus from the journals------but for Socrates the stakes are life and death.
On a smaller scale something like this is apparent in my life. For my personal 
existence has much greater value and is strenuous in a quite different way 
than my writings. But this is completely misunderstood by this theatrical 
generation------
But Socrates is the only one of his kind! Such a cultivated intellect, so very 
subtly educated and sharpened that presumably such a man would need all 
the coddling and all the remoteness from actuality that a poet, an artist, needs 
and then to be the toughest character in Greece, one who does not produce 
in a study but in the most crucial actuality------
Outside Christianity Socrates is the only man of whom it may be said: he 
explodes existence, which is seen quite simply in his elimination of the separa­
tion between poetry and actuality. Our lives are such that a poet portrays
ideality----- but actuality is a hell of a lot different. Socrates is an ideality higher
than any poet is able to poetize it, and he actually is this, it is his actuality. This 
is why it is all wrong for Oehlenschlager to want to poetize Socrates. In relation 
to Socrates “the poet” is a completely superfluous person who can only become 
an object of ridicule, a laughing-stock, when he does not keep the proper 
distance but even wants to poetize him. What does it mean to poetize? It means 
to contribute ideality. The poet takes an actuality which lacks something of 
ideality and adds to it, and this is the poem. But good God, your Lordship, there 
is no need at all to add anything here; Socrates’ ideality is higher, and it is 
that precisely by being actuality. This is why the poet, when he wants to 
poetize, finds himself in the same situation as the orator Johannes Climamus 
tells about, who at the climax of his address confuses the direction and ascends
from the higher to the lower; the poet pulls Socrates down------yet I have
enough of the Socratic in me to understand that I did not get Oehlenschlager 
to understand this.
What a wonderful Socratic difficult! In order to poetize a man it is surely 
necessary first to understand him. But Socrates himself says: “To understand 
is to be.” O, dear poet, if you were able to understand this it would never enter 
your head to poetize it. Consequently it can be poetized only if it is not under­
stood, or to poetize Socrates is eo ipso a misunderstanding, and to praise a poet 
for having poetized Socrates in a masterpiece makes a fool of him.
A great character but lacking an equivalent intellect can be poetized by 
poetically adding that equivalent intellect, or, conversely, by poetically adding 
something of character to a superior intellect. But where intellect and character 
are equally superior, there is nothing for the poet.
How ridiculous for a poet to want to seize hold of Socrates------Socrates’
whole intention was to put an end to the poetic and to apply the ethical, the 
whole point of which is that it is actuality.” (Pap. XI,1 A 430 n. d., 1854, transl. 
by H. Hong).
This long entry from Kierkegaard’s Journal is not chosen by chance. It stresses 
the very issue on which the duplicity of Kierkegaard’s concept of the poet is 
based: the dialectics of existence between idea and actuality, and between
possibility and actuality i. e. the poet’s effort in making the existence of a poet 
(Digter-Existens) congrue with his historical actuality (Digter-Tilværelse).
Kierkegaard discusses at length this issue in “The Concept of Irony” and his 
considerations about actuality and about to live poetically in ideality written 
in this book of early 1841, both with referance to Socrates’ irony and to the 
romantic irony, already contain the germ of his ethical-religious thought which 
in the later works concerns the poet-dialectician and subjective thinker. The 
aesthetical ideals of the poet must be proved by his personal actuality in 
existence. The poet who is also an aesthetically featured man, must live 
poetically in so far as he considers poetry and aesthetics like view of life 
terminus a quo’1 in his striving for the ethical-religious Christian view of life.
A. Oehlenschlager heralded the arrival of Danish romanticism. In his poem 
Aladdin, or the Wonderful Lamp, which Brandes2 termed the corner-stone of 
Danish literature during the first half of the nineteenth century, the acquisition 
of the power of the lamp symbolizes the romantic idea that the poet alone 
can penetrate into the spiritual realm of reality. This romantic belief supports 
Oehlenschlager’s need for concreteness in poetry.3 However, this poetry has 
not the outcome of sheer subjectivity as for the German school of romantic 
poetry, nor sustained by a Socratic “mastered irony”. O.’s poet must realize 
the task of actuality like a moment in the content of personality. What does 
matter is the pantheistic infinity of poetry, the poet’s relation to the world 
unfolded in beauty, the harmonic unity of the inner with the outer, this latter 
as sublime nature displayed for contemplation. Oehlenschlager is not on the 
side of the “inner”, the Fichtian principle that subjectivity, the ego, has 
constitutive validity, that it alone is the almighty. He is not the “romantic 
ironist who produces himself as well as his environment with the greatest 
poetic licence so that his life finally loses all continuity.”4
O.’s poet loses as well the continuity of his life, or rather he never builds 
one, but the greatest poetic licence is in his case on the side of the “auter”. Are 
the sublime nature, the love of the past, the sense of Danish glories, conse­
quently the originality in having brought upon the stage and animated with 
his poetry all those mythical figures of which the Scandinavian sagas are filled 
which produce the inner continuity and the need for concreteness in O.’s poetry.
“But actuality (the historical actuality) relates in a twofold way to the 
subject; partly as a gift which will not admit of being rejected, and partly as 
a task to be realized.”
“Partly as a gift, this was intended to express the relation of the individual 
to the past. Irony, however, has not past. Insofar as irony should be so con­
ventional as to accept a past, this past must then be of such nature that irony 
can retain its freedom over it, continue to ply its pranks on it. It was therefore 
the mythical aspect of history, saga and fairy-tale, which especially found grace 
in its eyes. Authentic history, on the other hand, wherein the true individual 
has his positive freedom because in this he has his premises, must be dispensed 
vith.”4
Even if O.'s worship of the mythical aspect of history, saga and fairy-tale 
does not fall under the category of such conventional irony, and instead he 
accepts the past in a pantheistic union with the infinity of poetry, the outcome 
is the same: the disappearance of historical actuality. And for a poet like 
Oehlenschláger who wants to size poetically in a tragedy, Socrates “who 
intended to put an end to the poetic and to apply the ethical,” the outcome is 
a self-mockery. On the one hand Socrates (“the only man of whom, outside 
Christianity may be said: he explodes existence with his elimination of the 
separation between poetry and actuality”) points to an infinite, to an “im­
mortality” which goes beyond the infinity of the tragic hero which does not 
surpass immanence. On the other hand poetic creativity cannot be conceived 
as an immediate self-creative act of life which enfolds in beautiful thinking 
the highest objectivity of reality, its hidden inner as in a mirror which reflects 
in miniature the essence of the universe.5 Such a creative immediacy, nearly a 
mystic one, however, which “clings closely to the sense-world and not to the 
religious sphere” does not apply to the poet's individuality, consequently 
Oehlenschláger has not need for an independent domain of the poet and its 
concepts, only symbols in the divine artistic representation.
For O. for whom ‘Kunsten er Evighedens Organ'6 actuality as task, or the 
task of realizing actuality personally in existence as a moment of the historical 
personality, vanishes in the exalted grandiose picture of the universe which a 
self-creative act of life can produce by an indisputable power bestowed from 
eternity. O.'s poetry aloof from the individual’s anxiety, leads to boredom as 
does the Olympus heaven where the gods, not faced by death and destruction, 
are beyond human creativity.
Oehlenschláger represents the antithesis to Kierkegaard's concept of the poet 
as one always in process of coming into being in his existential movement, his 
dynamic and thrilling creativity which the dialectics of existence between
actuality and possibility motives. “It is one thing poetically to produce oneself, 
quite another to allow oneself to be poetically produced. The Christian allows 
himself to be poetically produced,” and this means that Kierkegaard’s poet 
acknowledges that the infinite poetic freedom as positive freedom concerns 
only the historical actuality by which the poet has been assigned a task.
But, if it is so that the poet’s life must express genuine actuality, certainly 
the poet cannot do it taking up descriptively Socrates’ actuality in regard to 
which his own is incommensurable. Fantasy and creative imagination have 
and must know their own limits to avoid ridiculousness. The poet must know 
when will not poetry matters, personal endeavor not representation. It is what 
Socrates, even as a pagan who did not know Christ the Man-God, understood. 
Therefore, he has marked the limits between aesthetics and ethics, however, 
neither in the sense that he has rejected aesthetics of which, on the contrary, 
he made the most valuable use by his maieutic’ art, nor in the sense that he 
has made ethical values a Platonic absolute thereby eliminating the dialectics 
between immanence and transcendence. But O.’s astonishing heavenly illusion 
of poetry as “stagnation”, for which the younger poet, esthete and literary critic 
J. L. Heiberg had characterized him as “a poet who had lost his poetical spirit,” 
is extraneous to such Socratic dialectics which make Socrates to surpass the 
classic world of Greece. Consequently O.’s poetry cannot hit the mediocrity of 
an age livelled in all values, also the ethical and religious, by an exalted idea 
of aesthetics. For a breath of reality to a sleeping age much more valuable 
than this unmoved and unmovable neo-classic artistic paradise is the hell of 
the romantic poet, no matter how negative it may be.
At the other extreme of Oehlenschlager’s exalted idea of aesthetics with his 
pantheistic infinite of poetry, the proper romantic school of Schlegel, Tieck and 
Solger represents aesthetics from the point of view of sheer subjectivity.7
The hell of anxiety, dissatisfaction, and criticism of the romantic soul here 
requires strongly an independent domain of the poet with all his subjective 
categories, and this domain marked by psychological tones till their ultimate 
consequences, can be outlined even today in the abstract and absurd tendencies 
of modern art.
The real issue is the almighty self. This summons down the beauty from 
the manifold of a fabulous and marvelous ideality to the manifold of everyday 
life with its small detail and the trifles in opposition to the heroic past with 
its trustful and divine grandeur. To both cases the imagination alone rules, but
very far from being blessed by the Olympus gods with a support of stagnant 
eternity, the romantic imagination goes through the numberless miseries of 
daily and frustrating experience. Aware of human misery to the utmost, the 
romantic poet gives himself over to despair for his conditions in bondage and 
the terrific void caused by a merciless, absolute misunderstanding by which he 
feels surrounded. The criticism of his almight irony leaving not unattached 
a single corner of the world while detaching him from all historical actuality, 
at the same time upheaves him more and more in himself, robbed from all 
world tension, in a life of dream. But in spite of this life of dream, the outcome 
of the ironist's infinite negative freedom which puts its expression in sheer 
feeling and sheer possibility without continuity in historical actuality, such 
infinite nothingness of the ironist may become “absolute beginning" in the 
sense of “the beginning of wisdom".
To this extent romanticism has been beneficial to an age which “has become 
ossified, as it were, within the finite social situation. Everything had become 
perfected and consummated in a divine Chinese optimism that allowed no 
rational longing to go unsatisfied, no rational wish unfulfilled."
“Thus it is not the sentimental or the chivalrous or the marvelous element 
which constitute the essential or necessary substance of the romantic. It is 
rather the infinitude, the freedom without physical barriers in the working of 
the imagination, in the intuition of the ideal, in the fullness and depth of 
feeling ,in the idea-oriented power of reflection, which we must look for the 
fundamental condition for the romantic and also for a large and significant 
share of modern art.” The world ought to be rejuvinated and romanticism 
rejuvinated the world.8 Here its merit. The calamity of romanticist is that what 
he reaches is not actuality. Consequently “whereas everything around him 
formerly slept, so everything now awakens but he sleeps. And since dreams 
do not satisfy, then, boredom, the eternity void of content, is the only continuity 
the ironist has.
Already in the first work “From the papers of one still living" of 1838, 
Kierkegaard stresses the importance that poetry must correspond to the poet's 
life. In all his aesthetic works the same theme is developed on the double 
meaning which we have seen consuming the dialectics of Kierkegaard's concept 
of the poet. On the one hand the existence as a poet (Digter-Existens) which 
concerns the poet-artist and the poet-author, this latter endowed with the 
universal language of the indirect communication. On the other hand the
poet-existing individual who is concerned with the task of realizing his historical 
actuality in existence (Digter-Tilværelse).
The romantic ‘ironist’ and the benefit which the age has received from his 
ideal of living poetically constitutes the background to Kierkegaard’s aesthetic 
masterpiece Either/Or which presents the dialectics of the poet in the alternative 
between the aesthetical and the ethical view of life.
As if the compact scientific essay on irony The Concept of Irony were winded 
off, and brought upon the stage and animated with poetical characters, the first 
part of Either/Or exhibits a philosophic sum of the life of pleasure as in the 
image of the negative infinite of the romantic poet. The description of Johannes 
the seducer made by the pseudonymous author of the first part of Either/Or, 
the poet [A], is an apology of the romantic life of pleasure which in the second 
part of the book gives way to an eulogy of altruism, sacrifice, and temperance.
“His life had been an attempt to realize the task of living poetically------the
poetical was the more he himself brought with him. This more was the poetical 
he enjoyed in the poetic situation of actuality: he withdrew this again in the 
form of poetic reflection. This afforded him a second enjoyment, and his whole 
life was motivated by enjoyment. In the first instance he enjoyed the aesthetic 
personally, in the second instance he enjoyed his own personality aesthetically.9 
In the first instance he constantly needed actuality as occasion, as factor; in the 
second instance actuality was submerged in the poetic.”
Johannes’ actuality is upheaved in sheer enjoyment, sheer possibility of 
experimenting enjoyment till its most abstract form of reflection on the 
interesting “How beautiful it is to be in love, how interesting to know that 
one is in love.” The “interesting”, this very romantic element already a main 
issue of Schlegel’s thought,10 leading Johannes’ attention at his own existential 
situation on the limit between poetry and actuality, appears to be at the same 
time his first stage of self discovery in despair. And it is despair which prepares 
the way to the leap of faith, the passion of inwardness which the poet’s un­
limited imagination and his Vis comica’ motives generating the “double­
reflexion”, the guarantee for the fulfilment of the individual’s personality.
“Imagination is what providence uses to take men captive in actuality (virke­
ligheden) in existence (tilværelse), in order to get them far enough out, or 
within, or down in actuality. And when imagination has helped them get far 
as they should be -  then actuality genuinely begins.” (Pap. XI,1 A 288, 1854).
As a whole the aesthetic work Either/Or is a subtle satire of the age, of its
exalted ideal of the poet-genius and the livelled aesthetic and ethical attitudes 
of life to which Kierkegaard implies a greater ideal, the religious attitudes 
of life.
The two interpretations of the poet, as artist and author, and as existing 
individual, which are dialectically intertwined are present not only in his 
aesthetic works but in Kierkegaard's literature as a whole, and all the more so 
as the existential movement from the aesthetic to the religious attitude of life 
developes. And this in accordance with the individuals need of ‘the un­
conditional’, which does not mean he had to free himself entirely from 
aesthetics, aesthetics being a constituent element of his humanity. “To live in 
the unconditional, inhaling only the unconditional, is impossible to man; he 
perishes, like the fish forced to live in the air. But on the other hand, without 
relating himself to the unconditional, man cannot in the deepest sense be said 
‘to live. He gives up the ghost -  that is, he may continue perhaps to live, but 
spiritlessly.” (“My position as a religious writer in ‘Christendom’ and my 
tactics” -  SV, XIII, 542, transl. by Lowrie).
Kierkegaard develops his concept of the poet, which echoes his own personal 
appropriation of Christian actuality, also by a stylistic skill suitable each type 
of works, the philosophical and the edifying, the aesthetic and the religious, as 
if he knew various languages. As if, so to speak, that immediacy by which 
the artistic medium of Mozart’s music expresses the sensous-genius in the image 
of Don Juan -  and music is the artistic medium of Romanticism ‘par excellence’ 
-  was the pattern followed by Kierkegaard in all his stylistic choice. A superb 
exemple of this ability to choose the proper medium of communication and 
which shows too how deeply Kierkegaard understood the danger of the 
aesthetical leveling of all values in his time and how he tried to counteract 
this danger by performing its opposite in the image of the ironist, is given by 
the stylistic presentation of Either/Or. Here the beautiful confusion and inter­
section of poetical arguments, both from the subjective and the objective point 
of view, the infinite succession of sentiments and reasonings without continuity, 
which the poet ironically enough is supposed to criticise denying his own 
aesthetical attitude to life, constitute a kind of perfect artistic medium to 
perform the extraordinary satire of the epoch which is Either/Or, this work 
which Kierkegaard’s epoch -  in one sense with reason -  exalted as the sublime 
(cf. Pap. IV A 45).
While sketching in images and ideals the various phases through which the
human spirit had to evolve itself in order to reach the absolute totality’ 
according to the speculative Hegel-Goethe belief of the time, all together 
Kierkegaard’s aesthetic works perform the spiritual development of a poet 
who, at the same time, playing the aesthetically featured man as an existing 
individual, lives disappointedly in the unearthly mirage of the absolute totality’ 
of speculative aesthetics. In so doing, as much confused and disrupted the 
stylistic presentation of the aesthetic works may appear, Kierkegaard offers 
true poetry as a motivating force, as a vital impulse which stimulates at distance 
the mind of the reader and keeps it in operation.
The imperative to free poetry and aesthetics from the tutelage of knowledge 
begins late as a consequence of the new humanism which characterized the 
philosophy of the seventeenth century.
A radical transformation of previous artistic standards takes place in the 
eighteenth century. The change becomes increasily apparent in the relation 
between human and divine understanding, when this is no longer a matter of 
resolving the finite into the infinite, and thus, so to speak, of eliminating it. 
Now it was required that the finite assert itself in its own character, that it 
preserve its specific nature even while recognizing this nature as finite. This 
point of view, developed in the systematic aesthetic of Baumgarten -  in his 
Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (Halle, 1735) 
-  while sustaining the autonomy of reason stressed implicitly the fundamental 
prerogative of finite nature to an independent form of existence. Taking 
Leibniz’s theory -  in his Disputatio Metaphysica (Leipzig, 1663) -  that divine 
being as such lies beyond the sphere of phenomenon and is essentially above 
that sphere, the eighteenth century philosophy gradually learned to do without 
the “absolute” in the strictly metaphysical sense. Instead appeared a purely 
human ideal which the age seeked to define and to realize with increasing 
precision and rigor in the different disciplines of thought. Aesthetics and ethics, 
especially concerning human conduct and human creativity rise to the highest 
rank which was held before by metaphysics in the strictest sense the discipline 
of ‘the absolute’. The philosophical mind had not to think itself above the gifts 
of intuition and imagination, but had to be endowed with these gifts, if it had 
to balance with the gifts of judgment and and inference. The inner unity of 
the philosophic system can only arise from such harmony, and only from it can 
the highest individual embodiment of the philosophic spirit develop.
The secularization of thought which is the most evident expression of the 
new philosophical development sees an ally in the ever greater role plaid by 
satire. As combined force of jest and earnestness, satire had always a special 
place in communication and in understanding. Originating in magic, satire 
evolved during centuries as independent domain of the comic and in the 
eighteenth century as the most refined ironic and humoristic sense of grotesque, 
with the function of directing men’s attention to their own conduct, to disclosure 
of self, and to consider themselves responsible for their own faults and virtues.
The philosopher becomes akin to the artist in a fundamental feature of his 
thinking, that of striving for totality which immanent to creativity, does not 
refer to a metaphysical transcendent order. The new appraisal of imagination 
and intuition along with the appraisal of phenomenon senses and passion of 
eighteenth century, then, not only validates aesthetics logically but also justified 
it ethically by the fact that art has now the peculiarity of activating the whole 
man. Art appears as an indispensable vital force to man’s realization of his 
true destiny.
However if aesthetics and ethics are the great allies of eighteenth century, 
gradually aesthetics is overrated untill in nineteenth century it reaches the 
priority. The problem of the beautiful as it was posed by the previous century, 
in nineteenth century led to a different philosophical anthropology marked by 
a drawing back the humanism and its secularization of thought to a new form 
of transcendence within the idea of the absolute spirit. This on its turn gives 
birth to the so celebrated image of the nineteenth century genius, the almighty 
and supernatural poet endowed by a metaphysical irony, whom had to become 
the target of Kierkegaard’s satire.
It is well known how the philosophy of Hegel and Goethe in the nineteenth 
century improved and even transformed the ‘humanistic’ need of the eighteenth 
century philosophy with the idea of the ‘absolute spirit’, the idea of ‘totality’ 
as ‘the absolute ideality’ grasped by ‘the beautiful plenitude of the objective 
thinking’. All these features concern the poet-genius.
Art has not desire to go beyond appearance and all genuinely aesthetic 
intuition exhibits variety and diversity, but these qualities in turn show a certain 
order and rule which do not proceed according to the rules of forming logical 
concept from the particular to the general. On the contrary, artistic rules 
apprehend the general in the particular and viceversa. Abstraction, which 
shows us the way to higher classes of concepts, always means impoverishment
so far as direct perception is concerned. Generality is attained only by dis­
regarding particularity, hence at the expense of definiteness. Aesthetics bridges 
this chasm, for its ‘midi cannot be found beyond or in opposition to concrete 
qualities, but it can be realized only by virtue of such qualities. Beauty requires 
not only intense clarity as does scientific concepts, it possesses also extensive 
clarity.
The poet-genius possesses intensive clarity and extensive clarity to the utmost 
degree unattainable to common man, consequently he can encompass both idea 
and phenomenon in a single glance. With his great sensory perception and 
imaginative power along with his natural disposition to perspicacity, he can 
grasp and perform the essences of reality as ‘en sand Mikrokosmos’ by his 
objective beautiful thinking. This ability is a spiritual attitude, is the attitude 
of a mind as a whole and is that which characterizes the spirit as poet-genius, 
which therefore cannot be acquired or learned but with which the poet-genius 
is born.
The new science of aesthetics in the nineteenth century, then, even if it 
abandons itself to sensory appearance without attempting to go beyond it to 
something entirely different as the grounds of all appearances, nevertheless 
resolves itself in a metaphysical anthropology which surpasses the limits of 
the eighteenth century humanism and finds its representative in the poet-genius.
The following comment of Kierkegaard on Goethe’s greatness as novelist 
shows how he understood this feature of the nineteenth century aesthetics. A 
feature which would necessarily end with the pretention to encompass in its 
“absolute totality” by the “objective beautiful thinking” even the actuality 
of existence.
“If I were to state briefly what I really regard as masterly in Goethe’s 
Wilhelm Meister, I should say that it is the capacious governance which 
pervades the whole work, the entire Fichtean moral world-order, even more 
doctrinairely developed in the novel, which is inherent in the whole book and 
gradually leads Wilhelm to the point theoretically postulated, if I may put it 
that way, so that by the end of the novel the view of the world the poet has 
advanced, but which previously existed [existerede\ outside of Wilhelm, now 
is embodied and living within him, and this explains the consummate impres­
sion of wholeness that this novel conveys perhaps more than any other. Actually, 
it is the whole world apprehended in a mirror, in a true microcosm” (Pap. 1 C 
73 p. 227).
A most valuable picture of the Danish cultural situation in the nineteenth 
century, saturated in all values by this exalted conception of aesthetics whose 
hero, the poet, with the gift of his metaphorical language: poetry, can grasp 
“the truth” is given by the work of Troels-Lund Bakkehus og Solbjerg (Copen­
hagen, I—III, 1922); especially the third volume to which we refer here together 
with the studies of Otto Borchsenius Fra Fyrrerne (I—II, Copenhagen 1878-80). 
In these studies (“Stillestandsmændene i Fyrrerne”, op. cit. I, 247-301 and “En 
Sjæl efter Døden” og “Adam Homo”, op cit. II, 19-87) are significant docu­
ments on the literary debate about the meaning of ‘ideality’ and reality* in 
aesthetics and from the opposed tendencies of Romanticism and Realism.
In 1854 when Kierkegaard wrote the remarks on the poet and against O. 
here reported, he had fully developed his philosophy of existence and the 
individual’s existential actuality grounded in Christianity. From this point of 
view the realm of aesthetics, to which art, imagination, fantasy, creativeness 
and all that is pertinent to the poet and his indirect communication belong, is 
seen at the same time as anti-thetical and related to the individual’s endeavour 
for actuality (Tilværelse — personal existence) which must be an existential 
Christian actuality.
In agreement and disagreement with the humanistic needs of the philosophy 
of his age, Kierkegaard is decidedly opposed to the doctrine of the poet-genius 
and the absolute spirit, as in the image imported from German philosophy.11 
And especially opposed to his contemporary J. L. Heiberg who having 
introduced Hegel in Denmark brought metaphysics into poetry. However, of 
the exalted conception of the poet which the nineteenth century Danish culture 
presents, he maintains the importance given to intuition and imagination in 
knowledge along with the importance of senses and passion, but ties all these 
meanings to the main topic of his thought: existence.
It is known that existence must not be confused with life, and not with the 
idea of existence. The conquest of the individual personal existence is the 
meaning of existence, and it finds its expression in the full awareness by which 
the individual in the light of absolute freedom chooses among all the pos­
sibilities which the imagination reflects from his life as an unfulfilled actuality. 
Such a choise, a terrific risk of free choice about the most decisive alternatives 
of life, the individual makes absolutely alone as if he were surrounded by void.
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When aware that ‘subjectivity is the truth’ the individual understands this 
subjectivity in the sense that, as an existing individual, he must choose while 
facing alone the deepest significance of existence: the dialectics between im­
manence and transcendence. This latter not to be understood in the sense of 
a Platonic concept but of the Christian reality makes him to choose as ‘if under 
the eyes of God’ or as if ‘God were the middle term’. Endeed the Christian God 
meets his creature, the individual who is a historical creation conditioned by 
space and time and tied with an unbreakable bond to his creator, in a personal 
encounter, being so that:
“Existence is the dialectical element in a trilogy whose beginning and whose 
conclusion cannot be for an existing individual, who qua existing individual 
is in the dialectical element” (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, SV, 1 ecL, 
VII, 270).
Linking the concept of the poet to the dialectics of freedom and the main 
theme “subjectivity is the truth”, Kierkegaard wants to point out in polemic 
with the “absolute” to which his age has exalted aesthetics, that neither aesthetics 
nor ethics are the disciplines of “the absolute” in the sense that it might be 
possible to eliminate the dialectics of existence between immanence and 
transcendense.
Aesthetics, however, if it acknowledges its own limits, is beneficial to the 
individual’s endeavour for his existential Christian actuality. But aesthetics 
cannot exhibit actuality. The most which the artist, the poet-author can attain 
is in using correctly his poetic insight far from the claim to perform actuality, 
so that he understands the meaning of the ‘mastered’ Socratic irony for which 
‘to understand is to be’.
Language is the common medium of scientific and artistic representation. 
But in the two cases the same means serve an entirely different end. In the 
scientific treatment of a topic the word functions simply as a symbol for a 
concept; its content lies in its abstract significance. This treatment applied to 
art would deprive art of all phenomenal content since art does not strive for 
the perception of knowledge in general, but for the perception of sensory, of 
intuitively experienced knowledge. The power of the artist, of the true poet, 
consists in his ability to endow the ‘cold symbols’ of the language with the 
breath of life, in his ability of saturating them with immediate sensory content. 
For this language of poetry is an imaginative language supplanted by meta­
phorical expressions. But language itself is essentially ideality (Pap. IV, De om-
nibus dubitandum est p. 144), consequently neither in scientific nor in artistic 
sense it can perform reality. Therefore even the most sublime poetry, if it is 
meant to perform actuality, can exhibit only an indirect message of it.
Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, making this the very issue of their philosophy, 
at the same time criticize the doctrine of the poet-genius of the nineteenth 
century aesthetics for which the poet is endowed with the power of performing 
the highest objectivity of reality. Indeed Kierkegaard's pseudonyms can be 
considered as a language, the language of the pseudonymous authors and the 
poet-subjective thinkers whose different personalities conjungate the discourse 
on existence. As putting in concrete characters the inflexional forms belonging 
to nouns and verbs of existence they group the infinite individual phenomena 
of existence each under its class, the aesthetical, the ethical and the religious, 
but not intended to convey any preconcerted truth the language of Kierkegaard's 
poets do not perform actuality.
Playing with irony, humor and all forms of the comic Kierkegaard's poets 
are “a special type of poets'' (Pap. X, 6 B, 8 p. 229) who communicating at 
distance with the universal detachment proper to language of art, make their 
discourse on existence effectual in arousing a playful disinterestedness both in 
the speaker and in the listener who so became aware to be both a receiver. To 
this extent they must realize the ‘how' they understand the communication 
about existence in actuality for themselves.
“The fact that there is a pseudonym is the qualitative expression that it is 
a poet-communication (Digter-Meddelelse), that it is not I who speak but 
another, that the communication is adressed to me just as much as to others .. .  
With respect to ethical-religious communication, I am not permitted to com­
municate more than I, the speaker (den Talende) am. If I place the requirement 
higher, I must express that this presentation is a poetic one (Fremstillingen er 
et digterisk) . . .
That the communication is poetic (digterisk) may be expressed either in the 
form of declaration by the speaker saying in his person: this is poetic-com­
munication, that is, what I am saying is the very truth, but the fact that 
I am saying it constitutes the poetic aspect; or that qua author the speaker 
can do it with the help of pseudonyms. The difference between such a speaker- 
author and the typical poet is that the speaker-author himself defines himself 
as striving in relation to what is being communicated.
And the whole distinction pertaining the poet-communication is related
again to Christianity’s category that Christianity is an existence-communication 
and not doctrine .. .
For Christianity the question is: does or does not my personal life express 
what is communicated. As long as my life expresses what is communicated, I 
am a teacher, when this is not the case, I am obliged to add: what I say is 
certainly true, but my saying it is the poetic aspect, consequently it is a poet- 
communication, which, however, is meaningful both for keeping me awake 
and keeping me striving, and, if possible, for awakening others” (Pap. X,2 A, 
184: Den nye Pseudonym (Anti-Climacus)).
Poetic communication, then, as universal language of art implies detachment 
from actuality and to this extent aesthetic is beneficial to the individual’s 
striving for his Christian actuality. However, if Kierkegaard’s poets do not 
fall under the category of the poet-genius, neither the detachment from actuality 
which is proper to the indirect communication reminds the detachment from 
concrete existence we have seen to characterize the negative infinity of the 
romantic ironist. For Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms and poet-authors who are not 
equal to God in regard to their writings, still remains a fixed place on heaven 
from which to cast a benevolent smile on human comedy. This fixed place 
that “the thought must allow to be born into the depth of substantial life 
(the Christian incarnation) is at the same time the guarantee for the most com­
plete detachment from actuality if what matters is the poet who communicates 
about existence, and for the most effective incitement in the receiver the com­
munication for whom what matters is to realize in actuality ‘how’ he has 
understood it.
Kierkegaard’s poets share with the romantic ironist the absolute freedom, the 
negative infinity which detaches the self from actuality, however, only as far as 
at stake is the universality of the communication. If what matters is the actual 
personality of the individual, then, the speaker and the listener who in regard 
to the poetic communication are both recipient are the very responsible. They 
are both responsible to allow the preoccupation with self to be so overwhelming 
to prevent them from taking decisive steps towards the realization of actuality, 
and in accord to the ethical-religious and Christian view of life. They are both 
responsible to allow the ironic escape from lethargy of the mind make them 
fall victim of lethargy of the will; both responsible to allow the radical 
boredom and the wretched spectacle of the creature turn them in demoniac 
wrath against the Creator. But even if the role of virtue will never be disclosed
in dark destiny by the recipient, selfdiscovery and rebirth from nothingness can 
always rise from the power of laughter of a “gudfrygtig Satire” (SV. XIII, p. 
505, My Position as a Religious Writer in Christendom and my Tactics) which, 
displayed by a true poetic communication, needs to destroy any hypocrytical atti­
tude of existence behind the magnificence of geniality, success and remote 
eternity.
In accord to such a true poetic communication, in 1854 Kierkegaard can look 
critically at his entire production from the point of view of the author. It con­
firms what already stated in 1848, the distinction of the production between 
the literary whole* created by the poet qua author whose aim is to communicate 
indirectly how to become a Christian, and ‘the authorship* lived by the poet 
qua man, the poet-dialectician whose existence strives to become a Christian. 
The self-criticism of the poet-author while causing the impossibility of publish­
ing during his life-time the work: The Point of View for My Work as An 
Author, at the same time proves how Kierkegaard has personally understood 
the lecture of a sound poetic communication which teaches that “the poet 
establishes and is established by -  the lack of something** (Pap. X, 1 A 198).
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